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FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO END DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN
PATSY T. MINK*
INTRODUCTION
The movement for equality of the sexes or "women's liberation,"
as it has popularly been called, has been outstanding in terms of the
publicity received. The results, however, measured by federal legislation
and state response to federal initiative, have been less than spectacular.
Since 1961 when President John F. Kennedy established by executive
order the President's Commission on the Status of Women,' similar
state commissions have been established in all the states.' Between
1964 and 1968, four national conferences of commissions on the status
of women were held.' In 1969, President Richard M. Nixon fashioned
a Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women and created the
Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities.' These national
commissions and conferences, while they have documented discrepancies
between the status of American men and women, have had little impact
on the patterns of discrimination which caused their concern. Perhaps
their most beneficial contribution has been the recommendation of both
legislative and executive action that should be taken on the federal and
state levels to correct the evils of sexual discrimination.' It is the purpose
of this article to outline specific legislative changes needed to attain the
goal of equal opportunity for women.
APPROACHES TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION
Studies and discussions have evolved three general approaches for
combating discrimination based on sex: 1) adoption of an equal rights
amendment to the United States Constitution, 2) judicial expansion
of the equal protection clause under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
* United States Representative from Hawaii.
1. Exec. Order No. 10980, 3 C.F.R. 500 (1963).
2. Steile, The Legal Status of Women, in THE Book OF THE STATES 379 (Council
of State Gov'ts ed. 1970).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 294--
99(1969).
4. STEILE., supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., INTERDEP'T COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOME'
1963-68 (1968); PRESIDENT'S TASK FOcE ON WOMEN's RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, A
MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970); CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN, THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COX-
sT=TUToN: A MEMoRArDUM (1970).
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and 3) passage of federal and state legislation to prohibit overt dis-
crimination and to eliminate situations which are discriminatory in effect.
While most publicity recently seems to have been given to the equal rights
amendment, it is the writer's belief that more immediate progress is
attainable through direct legislative enactments.
The Equal Rights Amendment
A debate on the merits of the equal rights amendment raged through-
out 1970. That this perennial visitor to Congress suddenly became
a "live" issue surprised many in Congress who had been accustomed
to introducing it every session with appropriate local publicity and with
the assurance that the potentially troublesome measure would be safely
tucked away in committee. These assurances were justified; the equal
rights amendment, introduced in every session since 1923, has rarely
embarrassed a Senator or Representative by requiring his vote. It has
emerged from committee infrequently.'
The routine of introduction and neglect was abruptly interrupted in
1970 when equal rights proponents used the unusual legislative device
of a discharge petition to pry the measure loose from committee.8
Representatives, not wanting to vote against a measure that they had
been routinely introducing and, thereby, becoming susceptible to criticism
for opposing women's rights, passed the amendment overwhelmingly on
August 10.' Since some 79 Senators had become sponsors as early as
the preceding May, final congressional adoption seemed assured.
The rosy predictions of passage did not reckon with the true state
of mind of the Senate. The amendment became ensnarled in a Senatorial
6. In the 89th Congress, 128 resolutions proposing an equal rights amendment were
introduced. 111 CONG. REc. pt. 22, at 1169 (1965); 112 CONG. REc. pt. 22, at 1014
(1966). In the 90th Congress 153 such resolutions were introduced. 113 CoNG. RFc.
pt. 28, at 1498 (1967) ; 114 CONG. Rc. pt. 25, at 1031 (1968).
7. Before the 91st Congress, an equal rights amendment had been reported out of
committee thirteen times since its first introduction in 1923. S.J. Res. 69, 86th Cong.,
1st. Sess., 105 CoNG. REC. 8555 (1959); S.J. Res. 80, 85th Cong., 1st. Sess., 103 CoNG.
REC. 15999 (1957); S.J. Res. 39, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CoNG. REC. 8018 (1956);
S.J. Res. 49, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. Rw 4313 (1953); S.J. Res. 3, 82d Cong,
1st Sess., 97 CoNG. REc. 5663 (1951) ; S.J. Res. 25, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CoNG. Rac.
2887 (1949); H.R.J. Res. 397, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CoNG. Rc. 7218 (1948); S.J.
Res. 76, 80th Cong., 2d Sess, 94 CoNG. REc. 5090 (1948); S.J. Res. 61, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess., 92 CONG. REc. 1900 (1946); H.R.J. Res. 49, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CoNG. Rac.
7505 (1945) ; S.J. Res. 25, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 CONG. REc. 5017 (1943) ; S.J. Res.
8, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 CoNG. Rc. 4033 (1942); S.J. Res. 65, 75th Cong., 3d Ses.,
83 CONG. Rsc. 5684 (1938).
& 218 Members signed the petition. 116 CONG. Rnc. H6962-63 (daily ed. July
20, 1970). The motion passed and the Committee on the Judiciary was discharged by a
vote of 332-22. 116 CONG. REc. H7952-53 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
9. The vote was 350-15. 116 CONG. Rxc. H7984-85 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1971], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss2/7
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
tangle of amendments and counter-proposals with the result that sup-
porters finally gave up in despair.1" The failure illustrated both the
difficulty in changing the nation's historic concept of the role of women
and also the shortcomings in the equal rights amendment approach to
obtaining immediate affirmative changes.
As adopted by the House, the equal rights amendment states:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any state on account of sex. Congress
and the several states shall have power, within their respective
jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
Thus, the language of the amendment itself admits that adoption per se
will not accomplish all of the desired results and that new legislation is
envisioned. Moreover, the language fails to specify how the goal of
equality is to be achieved. When a law sets forth different standards of
treatment for men and women, equality can be gained by either lowering
the standard for one sex or raising that of the other. California, for
example, has a minimum wage law for women but none for men. 2
"Equality" under the equal rights amendment could result in the elimina-
tion of minimum wages for women. A better solution would be to
state affirmatively in the amendment that equality will be obtained by
extending to both sexes the right or benefit now possessed by one sex.
In the California example, the minimum wage law would be extended to
men as well as women. In cases where the law in question is offensive,"3
swift repeal could be expected. Until proponents of the equal rights
amendment draft language to achieve the exact goals on which the
required majority of national and state legislators can agree, not only
will the outlook for adoption of such an amendment remain in doubt,
but also, even if the amendment were adopted, its goal could be subverted
by unsympathetic interpretation.'"
Judicial Protection Under The Equal Protection Clause
If reliance upon an equal rights amedments seems dubious, the
10. 116 CONG. Rac. S18075 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1970). An equal rights amendment
has been introduced in the 92d Congress. S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
11. H.J. Res. 264, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1969).
12. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1171 et seq. (West 1955).
13. E.g., ch. 69, [1894] Miss. Laws (repealed 1968), which excluded women from
juries in Mississippi courts. Such exclusion has not been held to violate the fourteenth
amendment. Reed v. State, 199 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1967), appeal dismissed & cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 413 (1968). For the present Mississippi statute which is non-discrimin-
atory, see Mass. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968).
14. The early history of the fourteenth amendment is a prime example. See R.
McCLosKEY, THE AmERwcAN SuPRma CouR 115-35 (1960).
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prospects for remedial judicial action seem equally remote. It is the
failure of the courts to apply the existing equal protection clause of the
Constitution to women which has brought about the current demands for
reform. Throughout our history, the Supreme Court has never faced the
issue of whether the fourteenth amendment protects women as equals. 5
Signs are now appearing that the Supreme Court will finally take a firm
position as to the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to sex-
based discrimination. Not the least important of these signs are numerous
instances of the past few years in which lower courts have answered the
question of applicability in the affirmative. 6
The Supreme Court has before it a case firmly in point. An Idaho
statute17 giving preference to male relatives over female relatives of the
same class as administrators of intestate estates is being challenged on
the basis that the statute is unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment."8 The outcome of this case is being
closely watched by both opponents and proponents of the equal rights
amendment. However, even if the Court finds sex to be an unreasonable
classification, it will nevertheless be unsatisfactory to have issues of
discrimination adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.1
Passage of Specific Legislation
The three approaches mentioned2" may coexist with each other-no
single approach is mutually exclusive. Should the Supreme Court apply
the fourteenth amendment favorably for women and should an equal
rights amendment be adopted, the need for legislation would not be
diminished. However, the judicial approach has the inherent problems
of delay while each particular situation or statute is contested through
the levels of the appellate courts. The equal rights amendment will face
the additional delay and uncertainty of state ratification if, indeed, the
resolution is adopted by Congress. It is apparent that obtaining passage
15. The Court has consistently maintained that classification by sex is reasonable
and within the police power of the state. Such reasoning allows the states to enact
legislation pertaining exclusively to women or to grant special exemptions and exclusions
for women. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) ; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
16. See, e.g., Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) ; Owen v. Illinois
Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401
(M.D. Ala. 1966)
17. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-314 (1948).
18. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 465 P2d 635 (1970), prob. juri., noted, 91 S. Ct.
917 (1971).
19. See the discussion of the Supreme Court's unhappy role in school segregation
disputes in A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESs 102-60 (1970).
20. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
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of legislation which deals with specific areas of discrimination poses
fewer obstacles than gaining ratification of a constitutional amendment,
especially since such legislation would be necessary in any case.
The passage of specific federal legislation has been suggested by
Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School. In the hearings of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in September, 1970, he renewed his long standing2' opposition
to the amendment.22 While opposing the equal rights amendment and
advocating legislation as the desirable alternative, Freund raised the
possibility that
Congress can exercise its enforcement power under the 14th
amendment to identify and displace State laws that in its
judgment work an unreasonable discrimination based on sex.
This would be done on the analogy of the 18-year-old voting
legislation.2
The basis for the approach which Freund only briefly touched upon
in his statement is found in Katzenbach v. Morgan,4 where the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress had the legislative authority under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment to prevent racial discrimination. Section 5
of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[] he Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."2 " In describing the nature of Congressional power under section
5, the Court stated that "§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2
Morgan eliminates the necessity for judicial determination that
sex-based discrimination is a violation of equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment. In upholding the constitutionality of a section
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,2" the Court stated that
[a] construction of § 5 that would require a judicial deter-
mination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by
21. See 96 CONG. REc. 865 (1950).
22. Hearings on S.J. Res. 6i and 23! Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1970), reprinted at 116 CONG. REc. S15124-26 (daily ed. Sept.
10, 1970).
23. Id. at 80.
24. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
26. 384 U.S. at 651.
27. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. I, 1965).
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Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining
the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congres-
sional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for im-
plementing the Amendment.2"
By applying Morgan to the problem of sex discrimination, Congress
could arguably forbid states to treat the sexes differently in any field of
legislation traditionally regarded as the province of the state. Indeed, the
potential for congressional action appears to be limitless. Such an approach
avoids the problems of delay and multiplicity of suits that are inherent
in fighting sex discrimination in the courts under the fourteenth amend-
ment or a future equal rights amendment.
Federal legislation can solve many of the problems of sex-based
discrimination. It can do so by amendment of present law to insure the
opportunity of the female sex to contribute to and achieve in all aspects
of life. Legislation can provide the tools with which women can
erase prejudices against their sex held by both men and women.
EXTENSION OF PRESENT LEGISLATIVE REFORM
While examination of the roles of men and women in our society
reveals benefits and discrimination to both, the evidence presages an
acceptance of the fact that the greatest and yet least defensible discrimina-
tion that women face in America today is that of economic discrimination.
In order to estimate the impact of economic discrimination, one must
examine the position of women in the labor market. As of 1969, 43
percent of all women of working age were employed. This 43 percent
amounted to over 30.5 million women. Of these 30.5 million working
women, approximately 11.6 million or over one-third had children under
the age of eighteen.29 Most significantly, though women make up 38
percent of all workers, the median income of full-time women workers
is only 58 percent of the median earnings of full-time men workers, i.e.,
annual earnings of $4,457 as compared to $7,664.8" No valid reason
28. 384 U.S. at 648. Morgan indicates that the test of constitutionality of legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to section 5 is whether the legislation is "appropriate."
[T]hat is . . . whether [a statute] may be regarded as an enactment to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is "plainly adopted to that end" and
whether it is not prohibited but is consistent with "the letter and spirit of the
constitution."
Id. at 651. The Court, applying that test, found the section prohibiting literacy tests
constitutional. See also United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970), upholding
under section 5 the right of Congress to lower the voting age for federal elections.
29. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, BACKGROUND FACTS ON WoM:EN
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1970).
30. Id. at 20.
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exists for such discrepancies between two major segments of the working
force. The question is what legislation can best put men and women in an
equal position in the labor market.
The Equal Pay Act"' and the Civil Rights Act32 have been the most
significant legislative attempts to erase the discrepancies between men
and women workers in recent years. The Equal Pay Act of 1963"3
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act3" to provide equal pay for
equal work to employees engaged in interstate commerce. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the only title of that act which refers to
sex) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.3" Title VII covers private employers,
employment agencies and labor organizations engaged in industries
affecting interstate commerce.'
The importance of these two laws is often underestimated by those
who, regarding present legislation as inadequate, cite the weaknesses of
the laws and the lack of achievements of women workers since their
passage. The Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act, however, were
major steps toward giving women equality in the labor market.
Not the least of the results of these acts has been the encourage-
ment of similar legislation on the state level.3" Prior to the enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, only two states had laws prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment; by 1970, twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia had enacted such laws.3" Since 1963, ten states
have enacted equal pay laws or fair employment practices laws with
equal pay provisions." The total number of states with equal pay laws
31. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1964).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1964).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1964).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
37. See 116 CONG. REc. S17348-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) for a summary of state
labor laws applicable to women. See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU,
STATE HOUR LAWS FOR WOMEN (1961).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (1969); ARIz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1462 (Supp.
1970) ; CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420 (Supp. 1971) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-6 (Supp.
1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (Supp. 1970); HAWAII R.EV. STAT. § 378-2
(.1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5909 (Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19
(Supp. 1970); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 151B, § 4 (Supp. 1969); MICH. CoMP. LAws §
423.303 (a) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §
48-1104 (Reissue 1968) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 613.330 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
4-33-7 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (Supp. 1970) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (Supp. 1969); WASH, REv.
CODE ANN. § 49.12.200 (Supp. 1970) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.325 (Supp. 1970) ; Wvo.
STAT. § 27-261 (Comp. 1967).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1003 (Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-135 (Supp.
1971]
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was thirty-five at the beginning of 197040 with four other states pro-
hibiting sex-based wage discrimination under their fair employment
practices laws." The example set by the federal government must surely
be credited as the primary impetus for this increased state activity in
the field of equality legislation.
Another aspect of federal influence is seen in the reaction of the
states to the sex discrimination guidelines issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to administer that portion of the act.2 In August, 1969, the
EEOC issued a guideline indicating that state laws prohibiting or limit-
ing the employment of women in such matters as types of employment,
hours worked and weight lifted were unsatisfactory because they did
not take into account the abilities of individuals and effectively served
as an excuse for discrimination against women. The Commission
1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (1969) ;MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19 (Supp.
1970) ; NEB; REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (Reissue 1968) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1 (Supp.
1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (Supp. 1970); S.D. ComP. LAWS § 60-12-15
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-SB-3(1966).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.155 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340 (SuPP.
1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-624 (Repl. 1960); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1197.5 (Supp.
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-3-2 (1963); CONN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-75
(1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1003 (Supp.
1970) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1702 (Supp. 1969) ;
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 4a (1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-135 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (1964); MD. ANN.
Com art. 49B, § 19 (Supp. 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (1965) ; MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.556 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.67 (Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 290.410 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-1307 (Repl. 1961); Nma. REv.
STAT. § 48-1104 (Reissue 1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 275:36 (Rel. 1966); N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5-12 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. LABOR
LAW § 194 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34.06.1-03 (Supp. 1969) ; Onao
REv. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (Supp.
1970) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 33363 (Supp. 1970) ;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-17 (Reenactment 1968); S.D. CoMP. LAWS § 60-12-15
(1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-SB-3
(1966) ; WYo. STAT. § 27-210.2 (Comp. 1967).
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-34-6 (Supp.
1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32, 111.325 (Supp.
1970).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
43. The present regulations are as tollows:
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels-"Men's jobs" and
"Women's jobs"-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one
sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant
the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex, based on assumption
of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For ex-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1971], Art. 7
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found such laws to be in conflict with Title VII and stated that the laws
would not be regarded as a defense for discriminatory employment
practices." Although a final interpretation of the validity of state protec-
tive laws has not yet been adjudicated," the guideline has had an effect.
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and North Dakota are among the
states presently enforcing state laws in accordance with Title VII and
EEOC guidelines."
The Need to Amend the Equal Pay and Civil Rights Acts
Although the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
have obviously had a salutary effect on the movement to end-sex dis-
crimination, much valid criticism has been heard regarding these two
ample, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than
among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes. Such stereotypes include for example, that men are less capable of
assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive sales-
manship. The principle of non-discrimination requires that individuals be con-
sidered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-
workers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
(iv) The fact that the employer may have to provide separate facilities
for a person of the opposite sex will not justify discrimination under the bona
fide occupational qualification exception unless the expense be clearly unreason-
able.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness
the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification,
e.g., an actor or actress.
(b) (1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative
regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these are those
which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of
females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of
weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the night,
or for more than a specified number of hours per day or week.
(2) The Commission believes that such State laws and regulations,
although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have
ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the female
worker in our economy. The Commission has found that such laws and regula-
tions do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of in-
dividual females and tend to discriminate rather than protect. Accordingly, the
Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations conflict with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be considered a defense to an
otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the applica-
tion of bona fide occupational qualification exception.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970).
44. Id.
45. At least one federal court has declared a "protective" state labor law uncon-
stitutional. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Cf.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
46. Ferrill, State Labor Legislation Aflecting the Employment of Women, in
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 513-14 (Council of State Gov'ts ed. 1970).
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laws. Teachers and administrative personnel of educational institutions
and state and local governments are excluded from coverage of Title
VII;47 administrative, executive and professional women are excluded
from coverage of the Equal Pay Act."8 Congress should act to end these
exclusions. Lack of enforcement powers also severely handicaps the
EEOC. The Commission is limited in authority by Title VII to only
conciliation efforts. 9 Individuals must seek enforcement through federal
courts which may or may not follow EEOC guidelines. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission should be given authority to issue
cease and desist orders to employers.
While the changes suggested for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
would aid the status of women in employment, amendment of other
titles of the act would be similarly advantageous. Title IV of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964"0 should be amended to authorize the Attorney
General of the United States to intervene on behalf of individuals to
contest sex discrimination by public school officials.5 ' This would enlarge
the present authority of the Attorney General to bring suits on behalf
of persons denied equal protection by public school officials. Title II, the
public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act,52 should also be
extended to cover sex-based discrimination. Sex discrimination should
be prohibited where it interferes with enjoyment of public accommoda-
tions just as discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin is presently prohibited by law."
Extension of the Authority of the Civil Rights Commission
A change in existing federal law particularly helpful to women's
equality would be the extension of the authority of the Civil Rights
Commission to the area of denial of civil rights because of sex." The
Civil Rights Commission currently has the following authority: 1) to
investigate deprivation of voting rights; 2) to study and collect informa-
tion concerning legal developments which constitute a denial of equal
protection of the laws under the Constitution because of race, color,
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-l (1964).
48. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (Supp. 1971), amending 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1964).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1964).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c et seq. (1964).
51. Such authorization, presently applies only in event of discrimination by reason
of race, color, religion or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1964).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1964).
53. See Seidenberg, The Federal Bar v. The Ale House Bar: Women and Public
Accommodations, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 324 (1971).
54. The Civil Rights Commission was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1975 et seq. (1964).
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religion, or national origin or in the administration of justice; 3) to
appra" the laws and policies of the federal government with respect
to equal protection of the laws under the Constitution because of race,
color, religion, or national origin or in the administration of justice;
and 4) to serve as a clearing house for civil rights informatinn.5
The President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities
has recognized the need to extend the Commission's fact-finding role
into the area of sex discrimination: "Perhaps the greatest deterrent
to securing improvement in the legal status of women is the lack of
public knowledge of the facts and the lack of a central information
bank."" In fact, a favorite criticism of the effort to secure equal rights
for women is the inability of proponents to provide concrete evidence of
discrimination in any but the field of employment. The role of illuminat-
ing racial discrimination, which the Civil Rights Commission continues
to perform, indicates the service it might provide in the area of sexual
equality.
Reform in the Executive Branch
The executive branch of our Government has been delinquent in
pressing the cause of women's rights. It was not until August 8, 1969,
that Executive Order 11478 decreed:
It is the policy of the Government... to prohibit discrimination
in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and to promote the full realization of equal employment
opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each
executive department and agency.5 '
Yet, the Department of Defense continues a policy of discrimination:
1) married American women are not hired to teach in our Government's
overseas dependents' school system;" 2) married women do not receive
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (1964).
56. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORcE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND REsPoNsmrrms, sup'ra
note 5, at 2.
57. Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 C.F.R. 133, 134 (Supp. 1969).
58. Air Force policy is expressed in the following letter:
Air Force regulations, equally applicable to males and females, stipulate
that normally we do not hire in the CONUS for overseas assignment, either a
single person with dependent children or the wife or husband of military or
civilian personnel stationed ... in the same country. One reason ... is that a
... recruit must be eligible to sign a transportion agreement with a reasonable
expection of complying with the conditions of the agreement. Our experience re-
flects that accompanying spouses are not overseas for the primary purpose of
government employment, usually resign from employment to go with their
spouses . . . and are not as stable as single employees ....
Letter from Colonel B. M. Ettenson to Patsy T. Mink, June 17, 1969, reproduced at
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equal treatment as "head of household" in order to qualify for family
housing and transportation privileges;" 3) certain benefits are not pro-
vided for husbands of female employees although they are available
to the wives of male employees."0 For years the writer has been working
to obtain actual executive branch compliance with the lofty wording of
its pronouncements, but the results have been limited to the extension
of post exchange privileges to the husbands of female armed service
employees." It is clear that the executive branch will do little in the
absence of statutory commands.
Current Legislative Proposals to Extend Reform
Congress offers an arena where efforts can be centered without the
hazards of judicial delay or administrative buck-passing. All too often,
the executive's public relations powers through unimplemented orders
and statements are sufficient to divert women's attention from the
specifics of legislative issues-yet, it is only in the Congress that goals
can be achieved. Admittedly, the legislative path is filled with obstacles.
The 91st Congress in 1969 removed a sex-discrimination provision
116 CONG. RE.c. H7209 (daily ed. July 27, 1970). Official Air Force policy states that
"[clivilian positions are filled without regard to . . . sex .... While supervisors may
specify that a particular position requires men only-or women only-the restriction
must be clearly justified .. " 32 C.F.R. § 890.2 (1970).
59. For example, a married woman working for the federal government as an
overseas instructor has been denied certain benefits because they accrue "only to those
individuals whose reason for being in the area is employment with the United States
Government." Therefore, a wife who accompanies her husband to his foreign duty as-
signment and who "incidentally" instructs in the installation's education facilities is con-
sidered to be in the area in order to be with her husband and not for the purpose of
employment with the Government. This distinction of purpose seems arbitrary at best.
Memorandum from John G. Kester to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, June 22,
1970, reproduced at 116 CONG. REc. H7210 (daily ed. July 27, 1970). See also USAR
EUR Reg. 210-50: "For married female personnel (military or civilian) the husband's
status will determine eligibility for housing." Id. The Chairman of the United States Civil
Service Commission does not find that such policy violates Executive Order No. 11478
(stating the non-discriminatory policy of the federal government) :
I do not believe that we can equate discrimination against married women with
discrimination because of sex within the meaning of Executive Order No. 11478.
... While the distinction here may seem more fictitious than real ... there
is, nevertheless, a distinction that cannot be disregared.
Letter from Robert E. Hampton to Patsy T. Mink, Sept. 25, 1969, reproduced at 116
CONG. REc. H7211 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
60. Such benefits are limited to dependents. Air Force Reg. 168-1 34(a) (2) de-
fines dependents to include. "(1) Wife who is not an employee of a federal agency.
(2) Husband who is physically or mentally incapable of supporting himself." Id. See 116
CONG. REc. H7211-12 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
61. Letter from Carl W. Clewlow to Patsy T. Mink, reproduced at 116 CONG.
REc. H7111 (daily ed. July 27, 1970).
H.R. 2580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), has been introduced to provide for equality
of treatment in the application of dependency critera.
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from the Civil Service Act which had prevented equal recognition of the
contributions of women workers to the survivors annuity fund62 but
failed to adopt a similar reform for the Social Security law. 8 Congress
also failed to approve other bills in the women's rights field, notably
H.R. 17555, the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act,6"
and H.R. 18278, the Woman's Equality Act of 1970.65 These bills
would enact some of the most important legislative provisions sought
by women.
The purpose of H.R. 17555 was to grant the EEOC authority to
issue judicially enforceable cease and desist orders.6" The bill also
proposed to broaden the Commission's jurisdictional coverage by deleting
existing exemptions of state and local government employees and educa-
tional institution employees connected with educational activities (the
latter exemption now adversely affecting the pay of millions of women
school teachers).67 The bill deletes the exemption of federal employees,
thereby helping remove inequities in the overseas school system and
elsewhere.6" The measure extends coverage to employers and labor
unions with eight or more employees or members, a significant improve-
ment from the present provision which prevents the Commission from
entering the picture unless twenty-five persons are employed. 9
The second priority bill, H.R. 18278, would amend current law to
extend protection to women. Its provisions would:
1) amend Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to authorize
federal courts to enjoin sex discrimination in public accommodations ;70
2) amend Titles III and IV of the same Act to authorize the
Attorney General to institute suits to eliminate sex discrimination in
public facilities and public education ;71
3) amend the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to extend the jurisdiction
62. Pub. L. No. 91-93, § 205 (Oct. 20, 1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 8341 (1964).
63. H.R. 17550, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
64. H.R. 17555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was sponsored by 21 Repre-
sentatives and referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. 116 CoNG. REc.
H4209 (daily ed. May 11, 1970). The bill was reported out of Committee but not acted
upon. 116 CONG. REc. H8502 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1970).
65. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill, introduced by Representa-
tives Mikva, Hansen, Jacobs, Koch, Symington and Mink, died in the Committee on the
Judiciary. 116 CONG. REc. H6296 (daily ed. June 30, 1970). It has been reintroduced in
the 92d Congress. H.R. 915, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
66. H.R. 17555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1970).
67. H.R. 17555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-3 (1970).
68. H.R. 17555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1970).
69. H.R. 17555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1970).
70. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1970).
,1. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4-5 (1970).
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of the Civil Rights Commission to include sex discrimination ;"2
4) amend Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prevent sex
discrimination in federally-assisted programs;"
5) amend Title VII of the same Act to insure equal employment
opportunity in the hiring of state and local government employees;"4
6) amend Title VII to remove the exemptions of educational
institutions from equal employment opportunity laws;"
7) amend Title VII to provide the EEOC with cease and desist
powers ;"6
8) amend the Federal Fair Housing Act to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in the sale, rental or financing of housing or in the provision of
brokerage services;"
9) amend the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to apply its equal
pay provisions to women in executive, administrative and professional
positions;"' and
10) authorize the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to
make matching grants to states for the establishment'of commissions
on the status of women. 9
The bill calls for the Health, Education and Welfare Secretary to
study and make legislative recommendations within one year to equalize
the treatment of women under the Social Security Act, the Internal
Revenue Code and other discriminatory acts."0 It also requires the
Commissioner of Education to survey all educational institutions and
report to Congress on any denial of equal educational opportunities
because of sex and make recommendations to eliminate any such dis-
crimination."'
ENACTMENT OF NEW LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Child Care Legislation
If the significant legislation of the sixties was the Equal Pay Act of
of 1963 and Civil Rights Act of 1964, legislation providing for adequate
child care will be the milestone of sexual equality in the decade of the
seventies. When over one third of the women in the labor force have
72. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1970).
73. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1970).
74. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1970).
75. H.R. 18278, 91st Cohg., 2d Sess. § 14 (1970).
76. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 14(h) (1970).
77. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1970).
78. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1970).
79. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (1970).
80. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(a) (1970).
81. H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(b) (1970).
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children under eighteen, 2 it is easy to conclude that the single most
important legislation for the cause of economic equality will be that
which creates an extensive child care program. 8 The lack of day care
facilities is a major obstacle to an overwhelming number of women who
are employed or who, more importantly, desire employment. It is difficult
to overestimate the importance of adequate child care facilities. Not only
are such services a necessity for many women, whether married or single,
but the lack of reasonably priced adequate child care deters many women
from either seeking a job or striving to advance to more responsible and
demanding positions. While the writer defends the right of any women
to stay "in the home" raising a family, the fact is that many women work,
either through choice or necessity. They and their children should not be
penalized simply because of the belief that "a woman's place is in the
home."
Lack of child care facilities is a major tool of discrimination.
Employers can avoid giving women equal consideration for advancement
on the basis of problems in obtaining good or even adequate child care."
This problem exists for both professional women and women performing
unskilled labor. The problem rarely has been solved in individual
instances without sacrifice either in money or human resource.
This decade must and will see the child care situation resolved. It
is a problem that is ripe for federal-state cooperation. Federal funds
undoubtedly will be necessary to alleviate some of the burden. The writer
is the congressional author of major bills in this field and feels that a
10 billion dollar federal program is urgently needed. 5 Such expenditures
are indeed justifable because solution of the child care problem will
have implications exceeding the issue of the woman's place in the labor
market. Readily available low-cost child care would aid the welfare
situation, alleviate the problem of untrained, unskilled workers, have a
noticeable effect on the public education system, and, in general, sub-
stantially affect the social and economic problems borne in this country
by the unskilled laboring class of minority groups. The President's
Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities has recommended
inclusion of provisions for child care in the Social Security Act
which would provide child care facilities for low-income and welfare
82. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
83. See discussion of S. 350, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), at 117 CoNG. Rac. S676-
84 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1971).
84. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
85. H.R. 19362, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 4190, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) ; H.R. 4191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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families." The Task Force also recommends federal aid to develop
child care facilities for persons without regard to income."
At the present time, Title IV of the Social Security Act authorizes
child care services under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program. 8 The federal government provides 75 percent of the funds for
day care services, but the funds may not be used for construction or
major renovation of facilities.89 Grants-in-aid are also available to state
welfare agencies for day care services for parents undergoing job train-
ing." A portion of these grants is a fixed grant with the remainder
allotted on a variable matching formula basis. Some measure of day care
service funding is provided by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, Office of Economic Opportunity, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Department of Labor, Small Business Administra-
tion, and the Department of Agriculture.91  The large number of
agencies, each dispensing relatively small amounts of funds, is one of
the drawbacks to federal support of child care at present. The above-
mentioned problems of restrictions on construction and the curtailment
of eligibility to low income families have prevented the full utilization
of child care programs. The programs are characterized by restriction
of eligibility to low-income and migrant families and are based on a job-
training concept. 2
Day care for pre-school and school-age children of welfare mothers
is a major provision of President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. The
plan purportedly will streamline and make more effective the nation's
welfare programs. It also provides for the availability of $386 million
for this program.9" The President's approach, however, has been criticized,
86. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WoMEN's RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra
note 5, at 13.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (14) & (15) (B) (i) (1969).
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a) (3) (A) (1969).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-22 (1969).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR DAY CARE PROJECTS (1969).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 622 (1969).
93. S. 2986, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill was introduced by Senator
Hugh Scott and referred to the Senate Finance Committee from whence it failed to
emerge. 115 CONG. REC. 28192 (1969). Section 102 of the bill would replace Part C of
Title IV of the Social Security Act in its entirety (42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44).
Appropriations to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare would be
authorized for grants and contracts for up to 90 percent of the cost of projects
for child care and related services for persons registered under the Family
Assistance Plan .... The cost of these services could include alteration, re-
modeling, and renovation of facilities, but no provision is made for wholly new
construction.
Statement of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Robert H. Finch, in Ex-
planation of the Family Assistance Act of 1969, reproduced at 115 CONG. Rac. 28192-98
(1969). The Family Assistance Plan Bill has been reintroduced in the 92d Congress.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1971], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss2/7
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
as inadequate both in funding and scope."
A number of bills dealing solely with child care have been introduced
in Congress.9" The writer's bill, H.R. 19362,"8 stressed child develop-
ment benefits as the major justification of the program. The bill rec-
ognizes the necessity for uniting child care programs under one agency
and the need for construction of new facilities. The bill was approved by
the House Select Subcommittee on Education and awaits further action
in the 92d Congress.
The child care program, unfortunately, must be virtually built from
scratch, and it must be done in a visionary way. Even the elimination
of poverty and welfare would not end the need for such a program. Any
program which purports to solve the problem must provide care for
parents of all income levels or provide for future growth toward that
goal. Child care programs should not be limited to lower income families.
Other Legislative Reform
Beyond the legislative programs outlined above, the possibility exists
for federal laws to enter entirely new areas of law affecting women's
rights. In light of the importance of economic equality to the efforts to
end discrimination, it is interesting to speculate how the Morgan deci-
sion, mentioned earlier, "7 might be utilized to achieve that equality.
Federal pre-emption of state labor laws is one obvious answer.
An area of the law which is not generally regarded as a federal
concern is domestic relations law. The inequality noticeably present in
that area is based on economic considerations since in the past the
husband has been the source of economic support for the family.9" The
theory of the husband as legal head of the household results in inequities
for both parties. In some states, married women may not establish a
separate domicile from her husband except in special circumstances.99
H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st (1971).
94. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. S4720 (daily ed. March 31, 1970) (statement by
Senator Goodell).
95. See, e.g., S. 530, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill was introduced by Indiana
Senator Birch Bayh and Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale on February 2, 1971, and
referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 117 CONG. REc. S670
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1971). For a detailed discussion and reproduction of the bill see id.
at S676-84.
96. H.R. 19362, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See 116 CONG. Rtc. H9016 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1970).
97. See notes 24-28 .supra and accompanying text.
98. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN IN THE LAW 35-99 (1969).
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-26(5) (Supp. 1969), amending N.D. CENT. Com §
54-01-26 (1960).
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Certain more obviously discriminatory laws exist in other states, such
as the inability of married women to contract or sue as an individual
without judicial approval."' 0
Property law and specific aspects of domestic relations law are
frequently mentioned as areas of the law in which the effects of an equal
rights amendment are least predictable.' Federal legislation grounded
on the Morgan rationale might be utilized to eliminate discriminatory
aspects of domestic relations law and also avoid the confusion resulting
from litigation of the constitutionality of various state laws.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of specific legislative proposals should play a vital
role in the movement toward sexual equality. Indeed, that approach
appears to be far more promising than the enactment of an equal rights
amendment or judicial expansion of the equal protection clause. Present
federal law has scarcely begun to effectuate economic equality between
the sexes. Current law designed to promote social and religious equality
should be amended to prohibit sexual discrimination as well. In addition,
federal legislation should be enacted to provide for child care programs
and to eliminate unequal treatment in property and domestic relations
law.
The goal should be to guarantee equal treatment for men and
women, thereby allowing them to compete and achieve on the basis of
individual abilities and ambitions. The fact of birth should not eliminate
opportunities, create obstacles, or deny success whether because of race,
national origin, religion or sex.
100. NEv. Rxv. STAT. § 124.010 (1969).
101. See 116 CONG. Rc. H7948-52 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970) (remarks by Con-
gressman Celler) ; 116 CONG. Rwc. S15124-26 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1970) (statement by
Professor Paul A. Freund).
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